‘If peace is concluded soon, the Polish question must lead to disaster. It has now become clear that at the Vienna negotiations in the summer nothing at all positive was achieved.’ This is from the diaries of Kurt Riezler, a German philosopher, diplomat and political adviser who died seventy years ago today. A few years after his death, the diaries fuelled a fierce historiography debate - the so-called Fischer Controversy - over Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War.
Riezler was born in 1882 in Munich into a cultured family. He studied philosophy and classical philology at Munich and Berlin, completing his doctorate under Heinrich Rickert. In 1906 he entered the German diplomatic service, working first in St. Petersburg and later in The Hague. Riezler became one of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg’s closest advisers during the First World War, shaping German war aims and peace strategies.After the war, Riezler held academic and journalistic posts, served as political editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung, and taught philosophy and political theory. In 1927, he wed Käthe, the daughter of the painter Max Liebermann, a leading figure in German Impressionism. Dismissed by the Nazis in 1933, he emigrated to the United States, becoming a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York. He returned to Germany after the Second World War, living his last years in Munich, where he died on 5 September 1955. Further information is available from Wikipedia or The International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
Riezler’s reputation as a diarist rests primarily on the journals he kept during the First World War, where he documented not only military and diplomatic developments but also his personal reflections on politics, culture, and the fate of Europe. His notes are valued for the insight they provide into the inner workings of German policy-making and for his candid assessments of allies and adversaries alike. The diaries were preserved and eventually published posthumously, most notably in the 1972 volume Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente, edited by Karl Dietrich Erdmann, which made accessible his important Ergänzungstagebuch (Supplementary Diary) of 1914-1918.
Riezler’s wartime diaries later became central to the so-called Fischer controversy, the fierce historiographical debate of the 1960s over Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. Fritz Fischer had already drawn on partial access to the diaries when publishing Griff nach der Weltmacht in 1961, using them to argue that Bethmann Hollweg and the German leadership were prepared to risk a European conflagration in pursuit of expansionist aims. Fischer’s critics questioned the reliability of the text, pointing to gaps in the surviving material, entries that appeared to have been rewritten, and the retrospective nature of some passages. Thus the very diaries that seemed to offer unique insight into high policy were also contested as to their authenticity and evidentiary weight, sharpening the lines of division in one of modern history’s most influential scholarly disputes.
Although I can find no published translations of Riezler’s diaries, the original German is freely available at Internet Archive. The following is a randomly chosen extract, transcribed and then translated by ChatGPT.
30 November 1916
‘Everything favourable. Romania. Great effect in the West.
If peace is concluded soon, the Polish question must lead to disaster. It has now become clear that at the Vienna negotiations in the summer nothing at all positive was achieved. At that time, Burian, under the compulsion of circumstances, gave in with vague phrases, but inwardly did not abandon the idea; in Vienna they still think of the old plan of swallowing the whole thing, want to spoil the broth for us, increase the demands of the Poles at our expense, and hope that in all the ensuing confusion the political leadership will fall to them. Now we find ourselves, after our hands have been tied by Vienna’s withdrawal (through the Manifesto), in a wretched position. If we wish to push back the Austrians by means of the Poles under the slogan of uniting the two administrative districts and appointing a Regent - both of which are the first Polish demands expected from the new State Council - then we shall fall into a mutual escalation of concessions to the Poles and their claims, which are no longer bearable and must lead to independence, as is now the case, and must make Poland into a centre of the wildest intrigues by West and East against us and our relations with Austria. Given the state of affairs in the Ostmark, and the unavoidable follies there even after the war, and the rancour of the Hofburg, we shall be driven completely under the sleigh. Added to this, any peace congress at which negotiations are not dictated under unequal conditions but rather conducted more evenly, will, under Russian, French, and English influence, ensure that the country becomes entirely independent and in no way turned into a Luxembourg-type state, and in this the opponents will still find support from Austria-Hungary. That would bring a fine debacle, this time for the Reich Chancellor and all German policy, especially as the whole world here believes that, after Jagow’s declarations to the press and party leadership, we had successfully resisted Austrian aspirations and prevailed with our thesis.
Here timely help must be given. Otherwise the country will fall, under immense disgrace for Germany, for the same reason as in 1815, because Berlin and Vienna cannot find a solution with Russia, and the whole hopeful beginning of a new line in Germany - and in this case in Prague - will be destroyed, and the country will be thrown back, in the German foreign policy, into territorial and spiritual dependence which may be convenient for some decades, but must then lead to ruin or vassalage under the Tsar.
I see only three possibilities: either to speak plainly with Vienna, resume the old position of a Kingdom of North Poland and divide it between the two powers, attempt to abolish the condominium, or finally return it to Russia with autonomy - or the third, best, though all doubt its feasibility - a constitutional union of the two Empires, with Bulgaria, to which Poland should be attached. Then it may be almost independent, and then the condominium may also go.
Here everything is decided: the whole system of salvation or fragmentation of Europe, and also the future spirit of the Germans, whether they will find their renewal in their best traditions or not.’